He leans back in his chair with a book on his lap and lights a cigarette; his crossed leg starts to jiggle. He is a tall man with a slim physique that suggests ill-health; in fact, he takes medication every day. In spite of living a demanding life, he is good-humored, and it takes much to ruffle his resolute spirit. His colleagues see him as an intellectual of the old school.  The Vice President of the New Mon State Party, Nai Rotsa, who married a woman soldier, leads an ordinary life.  He ranks No. 2 in the New Mon State Party, but does not put on airs common to an elite class and enjoys the companionship of the ordinary soldiers who share the same ideas and convictions. When he is on duty and has to travel, he refuses to have security guards along for his safety.  Once when he was arrested by a Mon splinter group, they later released him because of his humble attitude towards the community and ordinary soldiers. 

Known as an excellent moderator for his role during the party’s major debates including the controversial Mon ceasefire and the 2010 upcoming General Elections, he is respected for his sharp insight and diplomatic approach on difficult matters and for building alliances with friends and foe alike which is appreciated by those who have worked with him over the years.

As a high ranking Mon politician, he speaks calmly and decisively when deciding upon which route to take. “There must be political will on both sides, but our position with them (the Burma Army) stands, if the Burma Army wants to talk, we are ready to talk.  If they attack us, we will fight back,” he recently stated to Kaowao News before leaving for the NMSP jungle base inside Mon State, southern Burma. 

Border Guard Force

The NMSP team, composed of Vice President Nai Rotsa, Nai Chan Toi and Colonel Layeh Gakow, met with the ruling junta’s Chief Military Affairs of Security, Maj-Gen Ye Myint, at a special meeting at the Southeast Command Office in Moulmein on April 7, 2010, to discuss the issue of the Border Guard Force.  The Burmese Army, however, failed to impress the cease-fire ethnic forces and the deadline in accepting the Burmese government’s BGF proposal that would have them commanded under the Burma Army’s Forces has since passed. The military junta has not yet responded to the NMSP rejection of the BGF before this year’s 2010 General Election, which has yet to be given a date to be held later this year.  In southern Burma, the NMSP and the Burmese Army have not formally declared an end to the cease-fire agreement, but the deal hangs in limbo and is perhaps on the verge of collapsing.

History of the 1995 cease-fire deal

The NMSP’s General Headquarters, at the Three Pagodas Pass Thai-Burma border, was taken over by the Burmese Army led by Commander Thuya Sit Maung in 1990. At that time, thousands of local villagers and NMSP party members fled to Thailand where they were able to build refugee villages and Mon schools inside Thailand in Sangkhlaburi Township near the border.

Then in the mid 1990s, the geopolitics of the region changed dramatically when the Thai government applied the carrot and stick approach to gain access to Burma’s natural resources. Burma’s beleaguered ethnic groups were entering a new phase in their struggle for self-determination. For the Mon, they were ordered to relocate their base and refugee camps to inside Burma in 1994 due to Thailand’s engagement policy with its unpredictable neighbor, who they saw as a business partner willing to sell its natural resources for rock-bottom prices. A key Mon supporter, Major Yeup, was arrested by the Thai authorities in Bangkok along with Mon political activists for their support in the armed resistance against Burma’s military government.  At about this time, human rights abuses increased dramatically all along the infamous Ye-Tavoy railway and Yadana pipeline projects which were fuelling Thailand’s booming economy and the western multinationals’ interests in oil and gas projects in Southeast Asia.

Under these circumstances and pressure from Thailand’s National Security, representatives from the NMSP met with representatives of the Burmese regime in Moulmein, capital of Mon State, from December, 1993 to January, 1994 with talks resuming twice in March, 1994.  Following these meetings between the NMSP and the Burmese Army, a consensus was reached within the NMSP’s decision making body known as the Central Committee (CC).   According to a party insider, the pro (led by Nai Tin Aung, Nai Soe Myint) and the anti-ceasefire groups (led by Nai Min Htut and Nai Hongsar) finally reached a decision to sign the ceasefire in June 1995.  Many felt they were getting a raw deal since it was obvious that it was forced on by the Thai authorities so they could exploit Burma's natural resources along the border areas where the Mon live.

“We have understood right from the beginning that this was not a fair deal.  At the first cease-fire ceremony in the Southeast Command, the Burmese Army abused the terms of the agreement and informed the Burmese general public that we (NMSP) were going to give up our arms as an insurgent group to them (Burmese military). They erected a banner at the ceremony and reported in their media that we had returned to the legal fold, this was a distortion of the facts; in fact we were not giving up our arms, this was not part of the deal,” says veteran Banyae Ong.

After the ceasefire, the BA granted the NMSP control over 14 designated areas and was told to discontinue collecting taxes from the local people in other areas. This was then put under the control of the BA who in turn financed the NMSP with approximately Kyat 3.5 million, 1000 sacks of rice per month and allowance to buy diesel with the government at a set price. 

Fallen stars

The change in the political direction of the NMSP after the cease-fire provided both advantages and disadvantages.  Many NMSP members, including women soldiers, retired and resigned from their posts while some of middle ranking officers enjoyed the urban life running various business ventures. However, since the cease-fire, the credibility of the Party is at its lowest than it has ever been since its foundation in 1958.  Experienced cadres and freedom fighters have chosen to walk away from the Party during this period, with many either returning home to lead a civilian life or migrating to Thailand, or resettling in third countries, such as Australia, Canada and the United States.

Senior leaders who resigned/retired from the Party

Nai Chan Toi (CEC and Joint Secretary General)

Nai Tin Aung (CEC)

Nai Nyan Tun (Chairman, District Administration)

Nai Lawee Mon (Chairman, District Administration)

Nai Aung Shein (Chairman, District Administration)

Nai Enn Dein (Chairman, District Administration)

Nai Aung Shein (CC, Senior Officer)

Nai Soe Myint (CC and Economic Department)

Nai Htaw Enn (aka) Nai Gho Seik (Senior Officer)

Nai Pan Hla (CC, Senior Officer)

Resigned/retired from the MNLA

General Aung Naing (formed pro-BA armed group)

Colonel Kao Rot

Colonel Myint Swe (aka) Nai Lawee Ong (joined AMRDP for 2010 election)

Colonel Nai Shaung (joined General Aung Naing’s pro-BA group)

Colonel Pan Nyunt (split and formed HRP)

Colonel Ko Tar

Lt. Colonel Kyaw Soe

Major Tin Hla

Major Khin Aung (joined AMRDP for 2010 election)

Major Khin Soe

Major Jalon Htow (formed anti-BA armed group)

Major Chan Dein (Mergui Division Battalion, split and surrendered to BA)

Passed Away

Nai Shwe Kyin (President, passed away in 2003)

Nai Htin (President, passed away in 2005)

Nai Min Htut (CEC, assassinated in 2002)

Nai Dhamma Nay (CC, passed away in 2004)

Colonel Win Aung (CC and Military Commission, passed away in 2001)

Nai Tala Mon (Moulmein District Administration Secretary)

 Nai Thein Win (Tavoy District Secretary, passed away in 2008)

 A fragmented force

After the cease-fire agreement, the role of NMSP’s armed wing, the Mon National Liberation Army suffered an identity crisis. Many fighters grew frustrated with the lack of employment opportunities because they had little work experience or a chance to work in administrative departments such as within the business sector and coordinating (liaison) offices.  As a result, the silence of gunfire led to a dead end for many soldiers in not providing any alternative careers or educational prospects for them.  Some commanders with lower levels of education broke away from the MNLA, with many stating they were unsatisfied with the cease-fire and who saw a lack of confidence in their leaders’ capability to stand up to the SPDC that further divided the Party.

More of a nuisance to the SPDC rather than a serious military threat, some Mon armed insurgent groups were formed. In 1996, the Mergui Mon Army Division under Majors Chan Dein, Sein Ba Than and Nai Ong split from the MNLA when the NMSP was ordered to withdraw its forces from the Mergui District base as per the cease-fire deal. The Mon local commanders rejected this outright and remained with their armed units in the resource rich region. When the Burmese military launched its offensive to flush them out of the remote areas in the jungle, the group later surrendered to the junta.

Next in late 2001, Colonel Nai Pan Nyunt arguing that the cease-fire agreement was a failure broke away from the NMSP and took 153 MNLA troops forming the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP). He vowed to resume the fight against the Burmese junta, but suffered a major blow in 2004 when all of his five children were killed in a mortar ambush in the jungle by a reportedly Karen Muslim group. Nai Pan Nyunt now remains with a small group near Prachup Kirikhan of Thai-Burma border.

Another small armed group led by Nai Bin and Nai Hloin became active in southern Mon State.  Nai Hloin later left his guerrilla unit seeking medical treatment in Thailand for a leg injury, while Nai Bin and Sok Gloin remained in southern Ye and Yebyu, an area closed off by the Burma Army where high rates of human rights abuses have occurred over the years. 

Another major headache for the NMSP occurred in 2008 when the Party's CEC member, General Aung Naing, recruited some retired soldiers to form another group. Shortly thereafter the senior general revealed all of NMSP’s party affairs to the SPDC forcing the NMSP to hastily relocate stockpiles of ammunition and logistic supplies. The old wily general, who recently appeared on a Youtube video dressed as a Mon king, reportedly faces mental stress. In his glory days he was an excellent soldier who had served in the Burma Army, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the NMSP.

Another retired Colonel Nai Shaung formed an armed group named the Rehmanya Army at the Thai-Burma border and later surrendered to the BA’s Southeast Command.  He then joined up with Nai Aung Naing’s group to cooperate with the BA’s plan to form a regional militia force.

Meanwhile, a guerrilla group led by Nai Bin has now joined forces with Major Jalon Htow and Nai Htoo who retired from the NMSP to resume the fight against the Burmese Army.  The group is based along the Thai Burma border in southern Mon State and northern Tenasserim Division.

The formation of these groups illustrates clearly the rifts that have formed within the NMSP following the ceasefire agreement.  

Shaky relations with the SPDC

At first the cease fire deal went as planned. The Mons enjoyed some business opportunities and could freely run their Mon National Schools. The villagers felt less threatened and did not face torture, arrest or forced portering by the Burmese Army.  In the years following the ceasefire, the two signing parties enjoyed some prosperous days and the political relations between the late President Nai Shwe Kyin and Burmese Army Intelligence Chief General Khin Nyunt grew less strained.   

“At the beginning we were granted business concessions in logging, fishing, transportation, and mining.  We also could trade with Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore even with contraband boats,” said Nai Soe Myint, a retired NMSP leader.

But things changed after the purge of Khin Nyunt and the occasional statements by the NMSP urging democratic change within the country irked the ruling junta. Some concessions were later withdrawn, most notably the lucrative logging rights that were revoked in 1997, purportedly over the group’s signing of the Mae Tha Raw Hta agreement which had a provision supporting the NLD.

In fact, both sides were disappointed on many issues during these years.   From the New Mon State Party’s perspective, the Burmese Army continued to enforce control by increasing its armed forces in Mon State confiscating thousands of acres of productive village land without paying compensation. Then the Burmese government gradually started to cut off NMSP’s monthly rice and finance supply which ended in 2005 after the NMSP boycotted the National Convention.  Meanwhile, many Burmese Army battalions and regiments were positioned in the brown area and even in the strong hold area of the NMSP where they sometimes intrude into the NMSP’s designated (liberated) zones.  In turn for the Burmese Army, the SPDC expected the NMSP to participate in the National Convention, to join the BGF, and support the 2010 election; but these have all been roundly rejected by the NMSP.

As Kaowao News previously reported; the weekly meetings between the two groups in the Southeast Command, called to coordinate business deals and security matters, were gradually reduced on a monthly basis then later on an invitation basis only. “They have broken the terms of the agreement by intruding into our zone, but we still want to maintain the ceasefire and continue the call for a dialogue to solve the political problem,” insists President Nai Htow Mon.

While no official statements have been made, recent reports suggest that the NMSP is already considered illegal. The border based IMNA (Independent Mon News Agency) reported on a meeting with the USDA in May 2010 in which Major General Thet Naing Win of the Southeast Command told the audience that the NMSP will soon be considered an illegal armed group.

Beyond the cease-fire

Weaknesses:                

Launching a resistance movement would be very difficult for the NMSP who will need to overcome many military barriers to reach their villagers geographically located on either side of the Burmese Army in the remote areas along the length of the railroad and the coast of the Andaman Sea.  Reaching the Mon population is very important because not only do they have to be protected, but the political existence of the NMSP depends upon having contact with their people in Monland in contrast to the distant support of the overseas Mon community and other alliances.

Geo-politics of the region has changed and it is not easy to supply the soldiers with provisions and weapons, and innocent civilians would be bombarded from both sides. Moreover, the deteriorating economy and hardship in the Mon community would hamper support for the armed conflict in the form of taxes. During the BSPP regime, the NMSP gained some taxes from the black market check-points, but now this kind of thing would be financially risky, unreliable, and open to corruption.

Strengths:                    

The ordinary people from all over the country are unhappy with the present military regime due to various human rights violations, the deteriorating economy and the daily hardship.  They are yearning for change.  The NMSP in this regard will gain much needed moral support from the democratic and other ethnic forces, including the overseas Mon communities and the Thai Mons living in central Thailand. 

The NMSP also have committed and capable leaders such as President Nai Htow Mon, Vice-President Nai Rotsa and Secretary General Nai Hongsar who are well respected by the Mon people. The April decision of the NMSP not to join the BGF scored points for the party proving that the NMSP is still in the political game. Nai Hongsar said if the fighting occurs it would be difficult at the beginning because the NMSP has been out of active duty for 15 years but he feels the Mon will overcome this. 

NMSP’s position

While the SPDC is trying to divide and weaken the Mons movement by all means, the NMSP stands firmly behind four principals:

1.     Not to dissolve the Party (NMSP)

2.     Not to disband the Army (MNLA),

3.     Not to separate the Party from the Army

4.     Maintain the 14 designated areas that were agreed to in the cease-fire gentlemen agreement

A shift in focus

When the representatives of the NMSP met Maj-Gen Ye Myint in the meeting in Moulmein this April, he warned that if the NMSP did not accept the BGF proposal they will have to regard the NMSP on pre-ceasefire terms.  What this means is that the resolution for the NMSP is to prepare for the worst, possibly open armed conflict.

Following this, the NMSP’s decision making body (CC) rejected the junta’s demand to transform into the Border Guard Force and are in preparation for a possible war. They are now on alert since the April 28th deadline and its members who live in the urban areas have been recalled to the jungle bases and have closed all liaison offices inside Burma except one in Moulmein, while the liaison officers have been demoted to the rank of CC. In the past they were given more decision making power with appointments to the rank of CEC.  

“I am very surprised that Nai Htarwara and Nai Tala Nyeh returned to the base, because we had thought they wouldn’t have given up their businesses and city life,” said a Mon Buddhist Abbot from Yangon to a Kaowao reporter. In the mean time, the Burmese Army continues to exert its control by intruding into some areas controlled by the NMSP.  In response, the NMSP is considering how best to resist the BA, by resistance war or by low level guerrilla attacks rather than developing relationships and business contracts with the SPDC.

“We have nothing to lose because the SPDC has stopped supporting us and have removed us from business concessions for some years now,” says Nai Chay Mon, the NMSP’s spokesperson based on the Thailand border.  Now most of the party members are recruited and located in the liberated area with about 1000 soldiers on active duty as they were prior to the cease-fire agreement in 1995.   

“If conflict breaks out, the MNLA today will choose mobile warfare rather than positional warfare.  The tactical knowledge is more important than numbers while maintaining a big army is a burden,” says Colonel Kao Rot.  

The Administration of the NMSP has been scaled down to two regions to respond the situation; First region, Tavoy District and Headquarters zone, is led by Nai Htawara (CEC) and Colonel Layeh Sem. The Second region within Moulmein District and Thaton District is led by Nai Tala Nyeh (CEC) and Colonel Banyae Mae San.

Ms. Bloi Sorn, a rubber plantation owner, fears her farm may become a battle ground making it dangerous to go about her daily chores if the security situation worsens.  Like Sorn, many Mons feel that cease-fire agreement has brought some progress over the past 15 years.  People were able to develop thousands of acres of wild land into rubber plantations and migrant workers were able to cross the border more easily than before the ceasefire during the time of conflict.  Remittances from migrant workers in Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, have provided much needed income for new homes, motor bikes and village festivals without fear of being attacked by the BA in their villages.

But the Mon youths are willing to defend their homeland as expressed by a Mon student in the Bob Htow Bulletin: ‘Freedom leafs are forever green, the more they are killed, the more they grow.’  For many Mon patriots, their spirit will never die unless the rights for self-determination for the Mon people are finally achieved.

From Sangkhlaburi on the way to the jungle base, Nai Rotsa told Kaowao, “I have chosen this path for over forty years and I am committed for the Mon.”