KAOWAO NEWS NO. 97

READERS’ FRONT

MON NGOS PUT UNDER CLOSE WATCH

Forced labor for Total PIPELINE

FARMERS LOSE LAND TO MILITARY CAMPS

RIGHTS GROUP ASKS UN COUNCIL TO LOOK AT MYANMAR

Supporters endorse the call to discuss Burma at the UNSC

NEW CFOB COORDINATOR RAISES EYEBROWS

An EU strategy for Burma/Myanmar

AN ETHNIC PERSPECTIVE: DEMOCRACY IS NOT ENOUGH

CHARM TONG EDUCATING BURMA

READERS’ FRONT

Dear Readers,

We invite comments and suggestions on improvements to Kaowao newsletter. With your help, we hope that Kaowao News will continue to grow to serve better the needs of those seeking social justice in Burma. And we hope that it will become an important forum for discussion and debate and help readers to keep abreast of issues and news.  We reserve the right to edit and reject articles without prior notification. You can use a pseudonym but we encourage you to include your full name and address.

Regards,

Editor

kaowao@hotmail.com, www.kaowao.org

_________________________________________

Dear Editor,

Thank you for your posting the “Interview with the NMSP President Nai Htaw Mon (in Mon).”   We can trust his commitment and new leaders of the NMSP.  It’s time for us in overseas to stand up with all Mon people inside Burma and to support the NMSP’s struggle.

Regards,

Kun Mon (Malaysia)

MON NGOS PUT UNDER CLOSE WATCH

(Kaowao: October 15, 2005)

Ye -- Mon Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working inside Burma are being closely watched by the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), according to one of its members in Moulmein, Mon State.

“We must move our projects outside (of Burma) because our activities are being watched closely by the military,” the young activist explained to Kaowao during an interview over the phone.

“How our published documents are distributed inside Burma is being observed by the authorities, not only in Rangoon, but in Mon State as well,” he added. Although the Mon NGOs has managed some projects inside Burma for more than two years, they have decided it would be better to move operations outside of the country.

Another source from a Mon women's community in Mon Sate said that even women’s activities, such as women exchange groups and various workshops have been put under the microscope by local authorities.  “The relation between the NMSP and the regime is not very good and it is very difficult to travel and conduct our work as well,” said a woman leader Ms. Mi Mi Chan.

The SPDC censorship also carefully checks Mon magazines, journals and poems before given the permission for publications.

The move by the SPDC reflects their attitude toward ceasefire groups, the sources said.

Forced labor for Total PIPELINE

(Kaowao: October 11, 2005)

Villagers in southern Mon State are forced to fence bridges and guard a small motor road that follows the Yadana gas pipeline.

“From August 5 to September 22, each household in villages situated along the motor road, where the Total Company operate a gas pipeline in Tenessarim Division, were forced to build fences around bridges with two edge bamboo and clear away bush from the area to increase security along the pipeline. Two people from each village guard the bridges now,” said a young Mon human right’s activist who recently arrived at the border.

“There are over 20 bridges along the motor road; the biggest is Kalein Aung, where a portion of the Total gas pipeline is located.  The SPDC Battalion No 282 takes special responsibility over its security, while some military columns from Battalion No. 473, 558 and 410 have been temporarily active around the area to prevent the Mon guerilla group, led by Nai Chan Done, to enter into the area,” said the activist, under the condition of anonymity for security reason.

Karen Villagers of Mi Chaung Laung village near the sub town of Klein Aung, where the center of the pipeline station is located, were restricted from their plantations and farms at nighttime for security reasons.

Human rights abuses are being committed by Burmese soldiers in areas close to the pipeline, mostly under the control of Battalion No. 282. Soldiers temporarily stationed next to villages rob villagers at night. Mon villages in the area of the pipeline are Alesakharn, Yarbu, Kyauk-ka-din and Kywe-ta-lin, theft is the most common type, incidents of rape have occurred.

“The villagers were banned to use lights at night.  The military orders the villagers not to go out at nighttime, so soldiers can steal possessions such as livestock and food.  This is directly the result of (Burma Army) 282,” the activist added.

He added that the soldiers frequently extort 1500 Kyats from each of household to put into their pockets. Sometimes the people must give their livestock, such as pigs, chickens, and ducks when the military column comes by their village.

The Burmese military has forced widows and children to do the labour on most of the projects. Miss Mi Chin, 38 years old and Mr. Nai Adain, 16 years old, from a different Mon village, were forced to work on the motor road bridges.

They were forced to fence the bridge and clear away bush. “I was forced to fence the bridge and guard it. The bridge is situated near my village,” he quoted Adain as saying. “Two people must guard the bridge under a rotating system.”

“Two months ago, there were many local people being forced to porter, and four villagers from each village were forced to go,” the activist said.

FARMERS LOSE LAND TO MILITARY CAMPS

(Kaowao: October 8, 2005)

A large portion of eastern Ye township has been taken for the construction of Burmese military camps and local villagers have been forced to work on a military camp four times a month. If they fail to show up, they must pay 1000 Kyat or face detention according to local witnesses.

Mr. Sharn (not his real name), aged 48 years old said, “village headman and local battalions together forced our villagers to do (unpaid labor) work.” The village is comprised of over 500 households. Chairman Nai Maung Lu and Battalion No. 583 and 591 instituted the process.

“They also extorted 1000 Kyat from each household on monthly basis,” the newly arrived refugee added.

“They seized our possessions, if we couldn’t pay the amount.” He added, saying that his plantation and farm were confiscated by SPDC troops without compensation last year and he and his family became internally displaced. 

“When they took our farm, we lost everything, and forced labor, and extorting forced us to leave (our home) to the Mon refugee camp on the border,” he said.

His plantation was put on confiscation notice by Burmese troops; it identifies the land as belonging to the troops (Tat Myay in Burmese).

There were about 200 acres of traditional plantations owned by villagers, for over three decades. The area at that time was under the control of NMSP, a Mon revolutionary armed group. Plantations were not included in the registration process due to being within the black zone area, in which SPDC township authorities had no access before the cease-fire agreement.

But after the ceasefire deal between NMSP and SPDC in June 29, 1995, the SPDC troops began to enter into the area to build military battalions.

Over 9 thousand acres of land in Ye township has been taken for the construction of Burmese military camps, seen as a direct result of the ceasefire agreement by the Mon community.

“Everywhere you go in Ye township, from east to west and from south to north, you will see notices of the land belonging to the troops (Tat Myay),” Nai Ba Mon from Ye town said.

Activism

RIGHTS GROUP ASKS UN COUNCIL TO LOOK AT MYANMAR

(Reuters: October 14, 2005)

UNITED NATIONS - A human rights watchdog asked the UN Security Council on Thursday to take a look at what it described as years of serious human rights abuses in military-ruled Myanmar.

"After years of inaction while the military government has decimated the political opposition in Rangoon and targeted ethnic groups in border areas, there is no longer any excuse for the Security Council to duck this problem," said Brad Adams, Asia director for New York-based Human Rights Watch.

Putting the reclusive Southeast Asian nation on the agenda of the 15-nation UN body was boosted by a recent appeal by former Czech Republic President Vaclav Havel and Nobel peace laureate Desmond Tutu for "an urgent new and multilateral diplomatic initiative" on the nation formerly known as Burma, he said.

The United States tried in June to raise political repression in Myanmar in the council chamber but was rebuffed when Russia argued the issue was outside the council's mandate of ensuring international peace and security.

China and Algeria also opposed the effort, diplomats said.

An informal bid to raise an issue in the council requires the consent of all 15 members. A country can also demand a vote, requiring the support of nine members to win it.

Despite the earlier failed bid, "the U.S. would very much like to bring this to the council if we can get sufficient support. We think it belongs in the council. We are out talking to people in capitals," U.S. Deputy Ambassador Anne Patterson said on Thursday when asked about the rights group's request.

"It's a tough one," she added, but declined to say who favored the idea and who opposed it at this point.

Myanmar's military has run the country since 1962.

The current junta seized power in 1988 and has locked up political opponents, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Her National League for Democracy party won elections in 1990 but the junta refused to hand over power.

Rejecting foreign criticism, Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win told the 191-nation UN General Assembly last month that interference in his country's internal affairs could derail his government's announced plan for a transition to democracy.

Supporters in Canada endorse the call to discuss Burma at the UNSC

(CFOB: October 12, 2005)

Burma supporters in Canada are sending a letter today to the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Anan to put Burma in the agenda of the Security Council.

Signed by ten Canadian civil society and Burmese dissident organizations, the letter strongly endorses the recent call of former Czech president Vaclav Havel and retired South African archbishop Desmond Tutu to take up an urgent initiative at the Security Council, in an effort to bring political reforms to Burma.

The letter demands strong action by the United Nations and its Security Council on Burma, stating “we feel that the United Nations is the most appropriate and effective channel to bring justice to Burma.”

Taking note of successful actions initiated by the UN in South Africa, East Timor, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone, Canada activist groups ask, “We would like to see the same action on [Burma].”

The letter also reiterates that it is the responsibility of the international community to use every instrument in its power to protect the safety and livelihoods of all citizens of the world and to ensure that all people are able to live in peace, freedom and dignity.

Further media contact: Jameel Madhany, Canadian Friends of Burma at (613) 237-8056; Than Aung, Burma Watch International at 780-439-7555

NEW CFOB COORDINATOR RAISES EYEBROWS

(Kaowao: October 6, 2005)

Calgary – Burmese activists in Canada have raised a ruckus about the recent appointment of the new coordinator for a Canadian Non Governmental Organization on Burma’s democracy movement.

The Ottawa based Canadian Friends of Burma (CFOB) recruited two new staff members, Tin Maung Htoo and Jameel Madhany to raise public awareness in Canada in cooperation with Burmese activists’ communities living in Canada. The coordinator’s main duties are to work closely with civil society groups and Burmese pro-democracy groups, including the Mon, Chin, Karen, and Shan communities to achieve public awareness on Burma issues among the Canadian population.

“It caught me completely by surprise. How can anyone coordinate (these) activities if they have consistently downplayed the role of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities in the restoration of democracy, in addition to criticizing the Canadian government, especially CIDA, in supporting humanitarian assistance programs among the non-Burman ethnic areas in Burma,” observed Chakum Pa of the Chin community in Canada.

Salai Za Uk Ling, a Chin activist writes in an e-forum, “I have nothing personal against Tin Maung Htoo, nor do I have doubts about his ability to run and implement the tasks required of him by the CFOB, but I am very uncomfortable seeing him in such a position given his critical stance and obvious prejudice against the non-Burman ethnic movement, as was clearly spelled out in his Burma Forum Report of 2004.  Given the responsibility of the position, it seems inappropriate to have a person with a proven bias or prejudice against ethnic issues to occupy such a position.  This view has been restated in various forums and discussion groups, but what is apparent here is there is an issue of conflict and interest in the appointment of Ko Tin Maung Htoo as the new CFOB Coordinator.”

In his Burma Forum Report of 2004, Ko Tin Maung Htoo referred to the ethnic movement as a "sub-movement," a movement that is counter-productive to the Democracy Movement.

Nai Mon Sai, the leader of the Calgary based Mon Canadian Society spoke to Kaowao saying that, “CFOB needs to make more of an impact on reaching out to Burmese activists in western Canada, where many of us live, but I don’t think the hiring of Ko Tin Maung Htoo will make any difference in that respect.”  

Dr. Kanbawza Win, a political scientist, said on a recent visit to the Mon community in Calgary, “as an academic and political scientist trying to establish a Federal Democratic Burma, I fully understand the Chin’s frustration.”

Both appointees graduated from the University of Western Ontario and McGill University respectively and have a wide range of experience in student activism, such as lobbying the government and parliament, as well as coordinating various Burmese organizations and NGOs working on Burma’s democracy movement.

An EU strategy for Burma/Myanmar

By Harn Yawnghwe

It is difficult to talk about a European Union strategy for Burma/Myanmar when everything about the country is so politicised and polarised - be it HIV / AIDS, humanitarian aid, or drug eradication, not to mention sanctions or political engagement. A simple well-meaning action or statement can take on unintended complex consequences and draw intense criticism from all quarters. The United Nations Global Fund to combat HIV-AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in Myanmar has become the latest victim in this 'Burma war'. It is a battle where one is more likely to be killed by 'friendly' fire than by enemy fire. The issue of a European Union strategy for Burma/Myanmar is further complicated by the question of whether the strategy should be developed and implemented by the Commissioner for External Relations, or the EU High Commissioner for Foreign Policy, or the rotating EU Presidency, or the various EU Ministries of Foreign Affairs who more or less deal with Burma/Myanmar on a daily basis.

EU-Burma relations in review

The European Union's policy towards Burma/Myanmar has unfortunately been a reactive one rather than a carefully thought through strategy. This is sadly true of the Burmese democracy movement as a whole, as well as of the international community at large. The process for the EU is perhaps complicated by the need to reach a consensus amongst the 25 member nations.

When the Burmese military, then known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), seized power in 1988 killing thousands, the EU reacted by suspending all bilateral aid. When the SLORC in 1990 held general elections, lost by a landslide and decided to ignore the election results, the EU reacted by imposing an arms embargo and suspending defence co-operation in 1991. With hindsight, the withdrawing of military attaches from the EU embassies in Yangon is proving to be a key weakness in EU strategy.

But after the initial furore over the elections, Burma/Myanmar was again forgotten as EU companies joined others in the rush to invest in the new open 'frontier' economy. Then, in 1995, the spotlight was turned on the regime's forced labour practices by the democracy movement as a campaign against the SLORC's "Visit Myanmar Year" tourist campaign. This eventually led, in 1997, to the EU withdrawing General System of Preferences (GSP) trade privileges from Burma/Myanmar. This also led to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) taking action against the Burmese regime in November 2000. The heightened awareness created by the GSP and 'slave' labour campaigns allowed the EU to adopt its first Common Position on Burma/Myanmar in October 1996. But while the tougher EU stance was appreciated by democracy advocates everywhere, the policy was out of sync with what was actually happening politically on the ground in Yangon.

In 1994, the SLORC had electrified the people of Burma by showing on state television, images without a sound track of democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) meeting with SLORC Chairman Sr. General Than Shwe and SLORC Secretary-1 Lieut-General Khin Nyunt. This was followed by her eventual release from house arrest in 1995. The situation was reversed towards the end of 1996 when ASSK's National League for Democracy (NLD) withdrew from the SLORC-sponsored National Convention. But in theory, the stronger EU position should have come when the SLORC-ASSK 'honeymoon' broke down. It, in fact, preceded it. From the SLORC point of view, it could perhaps be wrongly concluded that the military's 'weakness' during the 'honeymoon' period encouraged stronger measures against it. The EU Common Position was followed by an even stronger US position in 1997.

1997 was also the year that Burma/Myanmar's became a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Prior to that, the EU could afford to have any policy it wanted without affecting any of its interests. But the issue of Burma/Myanmar became a bone of contention between the EU and ASEAN and it affected their long-tern relationship for many years. And when the EU Common Position was strengthened in October 1998, not much was added beyond widening the visa ban on Burmese officials.

In early 2000, the now renamed State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) launched a campaign to 'annihilate' both ASSK and the NLD. But by then, the EU no longer had any means/1eft to influence the SPDC, and in April 2000, the Council had to take the mainly symbolic action of adding to the Common Position some restrictive measures against the regime. Realising its weakened position, the Council reiterated its desire to establish a meaningful political dialogue with the SPDC and indicated that the visa ban for the Burmese Foreign Minister might be waived where this would be in the interests of the EU. This in fact, contradicted the earlier position adopted nine years previously to downgrade official contacts. But the real difficulty was not having military attaches in situ since 1991. This meant that the EU had no real channels through which it could talk with the Burmese military.

Fortunately for all concerned, the SPDC backed off its campaign to 'annihilate' ASSK and the NLD, and instead embarked in October 2000 on 'confidential talks' with ASSK. When the 'talks' with ASSK which were 'facilitated' by the UN Special Envoy for Burma, Ambassador Razali, began to break down in 2003, the EU Common Position was strengthened once again in April 2003. But as previously, it consisted only of an extension of the scope of existing sanctions. Some including the then British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister Mike O'Brien have speculated whether a relaxation of the EU position at that time might not have helped to soften the SPDC's position. But the die was probably already cast when the US refused to "certify" the SPDC's drug control efforts in February 2003.

The EU position on Burma/Myanmar took a strange turn in 2004. Until ASEAN, Burma/Myanmar was a side issue and was becoming an irritant. But with the expansion of the EU, the expansion of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) became a crucial issue and the inclusion of Burma/Myanmar became the centre of the dispute. In a bid to influence ASEAN, the EU threatened to boycott ASEM if Burma/Myanmar was included, and in April 2004, the EU Common Position on Burma/Myanmar was extended by the Council. But when ASEAN called their bluff, the EU had to agree to Burma/Myanmar participating in the ASEM Summit, though on a level below that of Head of State or Government. As a face-saving mechanism, the EU also decided that further sanctions against the military regime would be implemented if it failed to meet certain conditions including the release of ASSK. The Council in October 2004 revised the Common Position and further tightened sanctions on the SPDC.

While the EU Common Position was renewed in April 2005, no changes were introduced. With the ASEM debacle in 2004 and the recent tension with ASEAN over Burma/Myanmar's chairmanship in 2006, it is becoming increasingly clear that the EU can no longer take its Burma/Myanmar policy for granted or act in an ad hoc fashion every time anew issue arises. While EU exports to Burma/Myanmar are negligible, totaling 54 million in 2003, and imports from Burma/Myanmar totaled only 388 million, Burma/Myanmar is becoming a major obstacle in the EU's relationship with ASEAN and its east Asian partners - namely China, Japan and South Korea. The socio-economic conditions in Burma/Myanmar are also worrying. There is a high risk of instability. Former Commissioner Chris Patten has stated that we could be witnessing the development of a failed state in Burma/Myanmar.

What then should the EU do? As mentioned at the beginning, this is a very dangerous field to be wandering in. Newly-appointed Commissioner for External Relations Ferrero-Waldner had a taste of this when the European Commission in early 2005 appointed an 'academic' to write a report on Burma recommending options for the EU. The British Government is currently in the midst of another firefight because it is hosting an 'academic brain-storming' session on Burma/Myanmar and did not invite all those who thought they should be included.

Recommendations
First, the EU nations need to agree that the issue of Burma/Myanmar is no longer just an internal affair concerning democracy and human rights. They need to agree that Burma/Myanmar has been a key obstacle in developing better EU relations with ASEAN, and it is becoming an obstacle in developing better EU relations with East Asia. It could also become an obstacle in developing better EU relations with the rest of Asia. In this context, Burma/Myanmar is an obstacle in developing regional trading blocs in a multi-polar world which is the EU vision. In addition, the EU nations need to agree that Burma/Myanmar is potentially a destabilising regional factor given its internal instability.

Second, the EU as a whole needs to decide what are its key interests in Burma/Myanmar separate and perhaps distinct from those of Burmese democracy advocates. Are these political -democracy and human rights; strategic; economic; or humanitarian?

Third, the EU needs to decide on who or what agency within the EU should have the primary responsibility for dealing with the issue of Burma/Myanmar.

Fourth, the EU needs to develop a strategic plan to ensure that its primary interests in Burma/Myanmar are served, recognising that it may not have sufficient credibility or political clout with the Burmese generals to achieve its objectives.

The EU needs to move away from the sanctions debate. Whether sanctions work or not, is not a relevant topic. The EU needs to look at the issue from a different perspective and identify its key interests:

It is clear that the generals in Burma/Myanmar will not give up power regardless of whether or not there are sanctions. Sanctions like the US ban on imports have clearly hurt the textile industry in Burma/Myanmar. But the Burmese generals intend to survive, no matter what or whom is affected by the sanctions. To them, their own survival and the survival of the 'tatmadaw' is synonymous with the survival of the nation. The problem is that the generals can continue to survive for a long time, whereas, the reality is that the nation as a whole may not survive. The country may disintegrate because of the social and economic strains, and the vacuum created could be filled by one or more of the neighbouring countries. If left uncontrolled, an HIV- AIDS epidemic could wipe out future generations. The question for the EU is, how can the disintegration of Burma/Myanmar and instability in the region be avoided? Can the generals be convinced of the need to change in order to 'save' the nation? What would convince them? How can they be approached? Who should approach them? When would be a good time to do so?

It is also equally clear that while the EU sees the Burma/Myanmar issue as one of democracy and human rights versus authoritarian military rule, Burma/Myanmar's neighbours in ASEAN and China, see it in a different light. They see it as an issue of western /north /superpower nations trying to impose their will on smaller weaker nations. If this perception is not changed, neither the EU nor the United Nations will get much support from ASEAN or China in spite of their concern for what is developing into a regional problem.

If the Burma/Myanmar issue is really an issue about democracy and human rights versus military rule, should the EU concentrate on helping the people of Burma resolve their own problems rather than focus on sanctions or EU or international action to solve the problem? How can the EU help to convince other nations to work together to bring about change in Burma? The EU needs to explore in greater depth to what extent it can work with the people of Burma/Myanmar including the military, and its neighbours to bring about the desired change that will serve both the interests of the EU and that of Burma/Myanmar. However, whatever the EU does, it can no longer afford to continue to manage the Burma/Myanmar issue on an ad hoc basis.

Harn Yawnghwe is the Director of the Euro-Burma Office in Brussels. Established in 1997 to help the Burmese democracy movement prepare for a peaceful transition to democracy after four decades of military rule, the Office was a joint project of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

The Euro-Burma Office manages the National Reconciliation Programme for Burma and in 2005, received funding from the Peacebuilding Fund of the Canadian International Development Agency, the Danish International Development Agency, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Irish Catholic development agency. 

AN ETHNIC PERSPECTIVE: DEMOCRACY IS NOT ENOUGH

By Maxmilian Wechsler 

The mountainous Chin State that shares its western border with Bangladesh and India is the least developed and the most neglected area of the six Burmese states, says exiled leader, Dr. Lian Hmung Sakhong. “We don’t have any factories or universities, no colleges, no good hospitals, no infrastructure and nobody explores for natural resources either.”

Born near the state’s capital Haka in March 1960, Lian Sakhong graduated with high honors from Rangoon University and Institute of Theology in Insein. He joined the opposition movement while he was a student at a Rangoon University in 1988. “I did so to change not only our Chin State but also the whole country. But working from an ethnic perspective, I have to emphasize and focus mainly on ethnic issues. In this struggle, we have to work for democracy as well as for ethnic equality and self-determination,” he said.

Because of his anti-government activities, he was arrested, interrogated and mistreated three times in a military detention camp between 1998 and 1990. Shortly after being released for the last time in November1990, he learned that the authorities planned to arrest him again, so he left for India a month later.

 “Just before I left, the government had declared me a ‘wanted person’ together with two colleagues, one Arakan and the other a Mon. Both were later arrested and sentenced to 20 years in jail. I was very lucky that I could escape. But of course, when freedom comes, I will return,” Sakhong said resolutely.

“The Chin State is administered by the people from State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Military government employs some locals as public servants. The Chin people don’t like the SPDC, who regards our state as its colony,” Sakhong related.

“Both the economic and political situations have discouraged a huge number of Chin people and that is why they chose to escape for a new life in other countries. They have fled mostly into India where at least 50,000 of them live in Mizoram State. They are not recognized as refugees but are classified as illegal immigrants. About 15,000 are staying in Malaysia where many are employed illegally in manual jobs and approximately 2,000 to 3,000 stay in Thailand. These who have been resettled in the United States come mostly from India and Malaysia.” 

On the issue of relations with India, Sakhong pointed out that when the movement started in 1988, Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress Party who were then in power supported them very much. But after the Indian government had changed its foreign policy a huge problem occurred for the Chin people in India.

He added that the two governments are now making some border agreements and constructing a highway between the two countries. “Since General Ne Win and the Burma Socialist Progress Party (BSPP) came to power, there hadn’t been a government-run trade policy, so people had to depend on black markets,” Sakhong said. “The cross border trading with India has involved mainly the smuggling of consumer goods and medicine, which has been carried on for a long time by many people.”

Sakhong has throughout his years in the opposition maintained his ‘ethnic perspective’, as he calls it. “People might say that to get democracy is enough but not for me!”

“Democracy is only for individual rights but what about collective rights for ethnic groups? That’s why I am working so hard for the ethnic perspective,” stressed Sakhong who now holds the posts of General Secretary for the Chin National League for Democracy (CNLD), the Ethnic Nationalities Council (ENC), the United Nationalities League for Democracy-Liberated Areas (UNLD-LA) and the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordination Committee.

His responsibilities as general secretary of all these organizations are to manage daily activities and business matters, to develop policy and strategies, to write policy papers and activity reports, and to plan for the whole year. On the top of this, he somehow manages to attend meetings and still has enough time to write booklets, presentations and theses. He has also written seven books. The first was titled: Co-existence: Towards Federal Union of Burma, published in 1999, and the last published this year, called: Designing Federalism in Burma.    

“The reason why I am spending most of my time and effort working for the ENC and the UNLD-LA is because we are fighting for a federal system, democracy, equality and self-determination. And this is also the aim of the CNLD and the CNF. We are cooperating also with the National Democratic Front and other armed groups,” Sakhong said, and added: “We don’t fight for the Chin independent country but for the federal union.”

He sincerely believes that the best means to solve problems in Burma  is to sit around the table, face-to-face and – as the United Nations General Assembly called for  – hold a tripartite dialogue that should include the SPDC, the National League for Democracy (NLD) and the ethnic groups.     “The generals don’t like it and have rejected the concept of dialogue because they know that if they are engaged in it, they will lose. For the opposition, a dialogue is the best weapon and strategy. But for the SPDC it is its weakness. They want confrontation and armed struggle, but we want  peaceful negotiation. I am not saying that armed struggle cannot be effective, but it is not a solution to the political crisis in Burma. That’s why we are calling for a tripar tite dialogue,” Sakhong declared.

He disclosed that the Chin armed resistance was represented by the Chin National Front (CNF), which has its headquarters located inside the state. They have had a number of contacts with the SPDC but didn’t agree to a cease-fire because the SPDC told them repeatedly to surrender first. The CNF, he says, now penetrates the whole of Chin society.

Asked about the rumors that opium poppy is now cultivated in the Chin State, he said: “I have learned that some cultivation started but I don’t have any evidence as yet. In 1983, during the BSPP government, they tried to cultivate opium poppy in the Chin State. I was then one of the student leaders at Rangoon University who signed a petition against the planting, and the government had to withdraw. We knew that they wanted to grow it there because the climate and soil was suitable.”

Sakhong described the last general elections: “The UNLD, formed in 1988 by all non-Burman political parties in Burma, won 67 seats in the 1990 election and became the second largest party in Burma after the NLD, just to be banned in 1992. In the same elections, three political parties – now also banned – the CNLD, the Mara People’s Party (MPP) and the Zomi National Congress (ZNC) won 3, 1, and 2 seats respectively. They are now members of the UNLD-LA. The CNLD, the MPP and the ZNC have formed together with the CNF, the Political Affairs Committee of Chinland in 2004. This will allow them to send their representatives to the ENC.”

Asked whether the CNLD, the MPP and the ZNC will be active again in the Chin State, Sakhong puts it this way: “Because of a strong military pressure, the opposition is not able to function freely in Burma and in the Chin state.”

As for the NLD, Sakhong said: “The NLD is still the only alternative together with the ethnic groups, and the people’s choice because they have won a majority of seats in the last general elections.”

Yet Sakhong acknowledged that in the present environment there is little that the NLD or Daw Aung San Suu Kyi can do against the government’s oppression. “Don’t forget that Burma is still under the SPDC and if you want to do something, you will be arrested!

“We need international support but unfortunately, our neighboring countries take advantage of us when our house is burning,” said Sakhong, and he also suggested that the NLD should change its strategy.

“The NLD should – instead of strategy of confrontation – engage in a peaceful negotiation strategy. They should encourage people to talk about peace, about freedom and about dialogue. They should do something!

“I am quite upset about its spokesperson, U Lwin who said that he never heard of a tripartite dialogue and that ethnic groups should keep silence this time around. Instead of encouraging us and working together, he just blames us. A number of  so called ‘democratic leaders’ like him say that democracy is the only solution but remember, our country practiced the democratic system from 1948 until 1962 and during that time, we ethnics didn’t get equality, nor the rights of self-determination. So we have to solve the problems together,” Sakhong asserted.

“When we students started our movement in 1988, the government and the country were literally bankrupt. But three factors have sustained the military government to this day: First is the ‘China factor,’ as its government has granted a large quantity of arms to them, which is a big boost to maintain their power. The second factor is that Burma is rich country in natural resources, and the government is opening up the country for investment. I accuse the neighboring ASEAN countries who rush to invest to sustain the government. Thirdly, an international factor, coming from inside Burma, is the drug money. Burma is the second largest cultivator of opium in the world. The government has signed cease-fire agreements with drug-lords such as Khun Sa and Lo Hsing Han, and all drug money becomes le gal and also sustains the government,” Sakhong said.

“Without the international help, especially from our neighboring nations, it will be very difficult to solve our country’s problems which are now not ‘our internal problems’, but because of refugees, migrant workers, HIV and drugs, they are regional problem as well. Therefore, the ASEAN countries should finally realize it, and come together to solve the problems.

“The good thing is that since last year some of their MPs formed the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus. And because of that factor the SPDC withdrew from the ASEAN chairmanship. ASEAN has been keeping quiet for a long time and this is not good, not just for Burma but for the whole region,” Sakhong said and suggested a first step to solving the problem with Burma: “I would propose to begin talks attended by the ASEAN countries, China, India together with the United States and the European Union, something similar to the six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula.”

Czech Press

The New Era Journal - October 7, 2005 (www.khitpyaing.org)

Asia’s Heroes

 Charm Tong Educating Burma

(By Andrew Marshall, Time Asia Magazine: October 10, 2005 Vol. 166, No. 15)

How's this for an intimidating experience? You're about to address a 200-strong meeting of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. Your topic is the long-standing campaign of terror by Burma's military regime against unarmed civilians in Shan state, the childhood home you fled. Your audience includes members of that same military regime. Also, you're 17 years old.

"My voice was shaking," says Charm Tong, now 24, and already a seasoned and celebrated campaigner for Shan state's embattled people. "But I thought, 'You have to do this. You don't get so many opportunities to tell the world.'" So she made an impassioned speech—the presence of Burmese officials only emboldening her. "They were forced to listen to what I had to say," she says. Three years later, aged 20, Charm Tong set up a unique school for young Shan in northern Thailand, which is now training a new generation of human rights activists. She is also a founding member of the widely respected Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN), whose meticulous reports have documented the rape of hundreds of women and girls by Burmese soldiers.

Charm Tong's political education started early. She was born in Burma's central Shan state, home to the country's biggest ethnic minority, and where killings and mass relocations of civilians were—and still are—shockingly common. Charm Tong was about six when her parents sent her to a Catholic orphanage on the Thai-Burma border, where she was brought up with 30 other children by a Shan nun. She saw her parents once a year. "I cried a lot," she remembers. "I was young and didn't understand why my parents had sent me away. Now I appreciate it. They thought I'd be safe and get an education."

She was a voracious learner. Charm Tong rose just after dawn for English lessons, attended Thai high school during the day, and took Chinese classes in the evenings. Weekends were reserved for studying her mother tongue, Shan. She was also schooled in the suffering of refugees who poured across the nearby border into Thailand to escape persecution or poverty. Unlike Burma's other ethnic minorities, the Shan have no refugee status in Thailand, and therefore no official protection or support. Many risk arrest and ill-treatment as illegal manual laborers, while women are often trafficked into the sex industry.

At age 16, Charm Tong began working with human rights groups, interviewing sex workers, illegal migrants, HIV patients and rape victims. The following year, she spoke in Geneva on their behalf—and still speaks, in four languages, with the poise and confidence of a mature woman.

In 2001 she set up the School for Shan State Nationalities Youth. Mostly funded by private donations, the school is located in a modest rented house in northern Thailand. Not only Shan students attend, but also Burma's other ethnic minorities, such as the Palaung, Akha and Pa-O. Due to the Shan's shadowy legal status, the school's exact location is secret. The young students, who sleep on the floor in spartan dorms, cannot leave the grounds unescorted during their nine-month term. "They're all under house arrest," jokes Charm Tong. Each year more than 150 young people apply; the school can accommodate only 24.

Survival comes first for many Shan, says Charm Tong, learning only a distant second. Even outside the conflict zones, Burma's education system is a shambles; untutored, even the brightest youths end up in menial jobs. "I was very lucky to get nine years' education," says Charm Tong, whose school is an attempt to rescue some of Burma's so-called "lost generation." Students study English and computing, and receive training in human rights action, such as how to collect testimonies and write reports, from Charm Tong and other local activists. Most of the school's 90 or so graduates now work for youth or women's organizations as teachers, human rights defenders, health workers and community radio broadcasters. "The idea is that they use their education to promote other people's rights," says Charm Tong.

When not at the school, Charm Tong lends her energy to SWAN, a small but vocal women's group whose "License To Rape" report enraged the junta. "Rape is still widespread and very systematic," says Charm Tong, who co-authored the report. "It's used to terrorize communities." Burma's generals, who dismissed the report as "fabrications," regard SWAN as an enemy of the state. Charm Tong is unfazed. "The generals are the enemy of the people," she shrugs.